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Abstract
The Malaysian palm oil industry is well known for the social, environmental and sustainability 
challenges associated with its rapid growth over the past ten years. Technologies exist to 
reduce the conﬂict be- tween national development aims of economic uplift for the rural poor, 
on the one hand, and ecological conservation, on the other hand, by raising yields and 
incomes from areas already under cultivation. But the uptake of these technologies has been 
slow, particularly in the smallholder sector.
In this paper we explore the societal and institutional challenges that inﬂuence the 
investment and innovation decisions of micro and small enterprise (MSE) palm oil 
smallholders in Sabah, Malaysia. Based on interviews with 38 smallholders, we identify a 
number of factors that reduce the smallholders' propensity to invest in more sustainable 
practices. We discuss why more effective practices and in- novations are not being adopted 
using the concepts of, ﬁrstly, institutional logics to explore the internal dynamics of 
smallholder production systems, including attitudes to sustainability and innovation; and, 
secondly, institutional context to explore the pressures the smallholders face, including 
problems of access to land, labour, capital, knowledge and technical resources. These 
factors include limited access to global market information, corruption and uncertainties of 
legal title, weak economic status and social exclusion. In discussing these factors we seek to 
contribute to wider theoretical debates about the factors that block innovation and 
investment in business improvements in marginal regions and in marginalised groups 
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Introduction
In this paper we seek to contribute to wider theoretical debates (Danse and Vellema, 
2005; Jackson et al., 2006; McCarthy et al., 2012; Terluin, 2003) about the socio-
political and economic factors that block innovation and investment in business 
improvements by marginalized groups including smallholders participating in long 
global commodity chains.  By comparison with large multinational corporations 
embedded in productivist systems, smallholders have the potential to develop 
alternative models of agro-ecological innovation, using minimal chemical inputs and 
including elements of land-sharing, for example intercropping and the deliberate 
preservation of certain rainforest trees (Dawson et al., 2014; Kitchen and Marsden, 
2009; Marsden, 2013). Alternatively, smallholders may choose to engage in 
productivist patterns of land-sparing sustainable intensification for example through 
the adoption of high-yielding planting materials and chemical fertilisers (Tscharntke 
et al., 2012; Vermeulen and Cotula, 2010).  However, an increasing number of 
studies from various locations show that smallholders are  engaging neither in the 
agro-ecological nor in the sustainable intensification pattern and instead are 
following different paths (Author 4, 2014; Feintrenie et al., 2010; Jerneck and Olsson, 
2013; Kusters et al., 2008; Otsuki, 2013; Pfund et al., 2011; Ruf, 2011). In this paper 
we are using neo-institutional theory to explore and interpret a specific example of 
‘different paths’.
In the case of Malaysian palm oil, current pressures from Western NGOs and 
consumers to improve the social and environmental sustainability of the industry are 
generating fresh definitions of business improvements linked to both the agro-
ecological and sustainable intensification paradigms of innovation (Greenpeace, 
2007; Teoh, 2010). Within this discourse, there is an acknowledgement by both 
NGOs and Malaysian policy-makers of the social justice imperative to protect the 
land rights and support the economic and social development of communities of 
independent smallholders (Cooke, 2006, 2012; Mahmud et al, 2010; Norwana et al, 
2011; PACOS Trust, 2008; Pye and Bhattacharya, 2013), while at the same time 
these communities have been criticized for their low engagement with productivist 
initiatives such as subsidised fertiliser use and oil palm replanting schemes (Baskett 
et al, 2008; Rahman et al, 2008; Teoh, 2010; Vermeulen and Goad, 2006).
In contrast to the various characterizations of smallholder behaviour found in the 
policy discourses, we explore the lived perspectives of a specific group of 
smallholders, oil palm cultivators in Sabah. We apply neo-institutional theory 
(Delmestri, 2009; Hodgson, 2006; North, 1994; Powell and DiMaggio, 1991) to 
support an integrated , interdisciplinary exploration of the ways in which individual 
actors’ perceptions, priorities and behaviour are influenced by their embeddedness 
(or lack of it) in local ecosystems, social and political networks, and by their 
engagement with other participants in the palm oil commodity chain. Through semi-
structured interviews and qualitative data analysis we generate fresh insights into 
what these smallholders do, what their priorities are, how they engage with other 
actors within the commodity chain, and what influences their strategies of investment 
and innovation across the full range of their economic activities (Author 2 et al., 
2010). We reconceptualise the smallholders as micro and small enterprises (MSEs), 
allowing for a clearer view of their own agency within the wider institutional context, a 
theme which until recently has been neglected within neo-institutional theory 
(Casper, 2010; Jackson, 2010).
Sustainability concerns in the palm oil supply chain
The debate about how to improve the social and ecological sustainability of 
Malaysia’s palm oil industry is one of a number of politically-shaped agendas for 
change in developing regions that are often driven by western consumers and food 
manufacturers and the organizations that supply them. Like coffee, tea, cocoa and 
many others, palm oil is a commodity with a global customer base that is linked by a 
long commodity chain to a wide range of primary producers located in developing 
countries with often poorly developed institutional and regulatory environments.
Recently the global palm oil industry has become a particular focus for criticism from 
some quarters. NGOs have raised concerns about rainforest clearance and the 
destruction of the orang-utan’s habitat, as well as about workforce conditions and the 
threat to local communities from the appropriation of land by large corporations 
(Greenpeace, 2007; McMorrow and Talip, 2001; Pye and Bhattacharya, 2013; Wicke 
et al., 2011). While transnational environmental and social activists focus mainly on 
critiquing Indonesia's corporate plantations sector, Malaysian policy-makers are 
equally concerned about their independent smallholder sector which is currently the 
fastest-growing part of the industry (Norwana et al, 2011; Teoh, 2010). Borneo (the 
island on which Sabah is located) is a key, and growing, region for palm oil 
production (see section below on the palm oil industry in Sabah for more detail) and 
is therefore a focal location for policy initiatives. These are aimed at raising 
independent smallholder incomes in an industry where government support has 
traditionally been focused on state-run organised smallholder resettlement schemes 
and the corporate sector. They are also aimed at improving the environmental 
sustainability of production systems, through subsidised fertiliser distribution and 
agro-ecological initiatives such as livestock and crop integration schemes (Pemandu, 
2012). However, officers responsible for implementing these initiatives (from the 
Malaysian Palm Oil Board for example) report that rural producers seem indifferent 
to their activities (Jalani et al, 2002; Rahman et al, 2008). They are continuing to 
engage in rainforest clearance and appear unwilling to invest in the improved 
planting materials, fertilisers and labour-intensive cultivation practices that would 
help them to maximise the yields from the land they have cleared (Abas et al, 2010; 
Mahmud et al,  2010;  McCarthy and Cramb,  2009; Wicke et al, 2011). They also 
show little sign of generating alternative strategies to support sustainable income 
growth through, for example, agro-ecological ‘land sharing’ initiatives as have been 
recommended elsewhere by those operating within agro-ecological and sustainable 
paradigms of innovation (Greenpeace, 2007; Baskett et al., 2008; Cooke, 2012; 
Teoh, 2010; Vermeulen and Goad, 2006).
Very little research has been undertaken on understanding the attitudes of Sabahan 
smallholders towards sustainability or into the factors influencing their patterns of 
investment and innovation, whether in palm oil production or in other activities within 
their working and family lives. Our paper presents an attempt to understand 
smallholder behaviour and their own lived experiences and perceptions, and in so 
doing help to explain why the issues identified by policy-makers and NGOs appear to 
be meeting with such resistance.
The next section of the paper explains why neo-institutional theory offers an 
appropriate framework to support such an inquiry.
The guiding analytical framework: neo-institutional theory
Neo-institutional theory (Delmestri, 2009; Hodgson, 2006; North, 1994; Powell and 
DiMaggio, 1991) offers a powerful analytical approach that can surface the historical 
and socio-political influences on current economic and agronomic behaviour, 
supporting an integrated exploration of the ways in which individual actors’ 
perceptions, priorities and behaviour are influenced by their embeddedness (or lack 
of it) in local ecosystems, social and political networks, and by their engagement with 
other participants in a long global commodity chain. In applying concepts from this 
body of theory to fresh empirical data, we hope to provide an insightful analysis of 
the factors that interplay in the lives of micro-sized palm oil producers in a remote 
rural environment.
Neo-institutional theory (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991; Selznick, 1996; Scott, 1987 
and 2008; Tolbert and Zucker, 1996) provides a useful framework for understanding 
the factors affecting rural Malaysian palm oil producers as it focuses attention on 
both economic and political factors as well as directing attention to institutional logics 
such as those that arise from culture or language and linguistic schema (Bourdieu, 
1991; Delmestri, 2009). It is a theoretical lens that encourages a focus on local 
issues, specific to time and place; and on the path that has led to present structures, 
that is, to the prevalence within a given organizational field (for example, an industry 
in a region) of specific social rules which structure interactions (Hodgson, 2006). 
Practices such as sustainable intensification may in themselves become institutions 
if they are internalized as norms by actors within the field, and/or codified and 
prescribed as a condition of membership of a group such as the Roundtable for 
Sustainable Palm Oil. The behavioural rules which constitute institutions may be 
written or unwritten, explicit or implicit, simple or complex, and supported by moral or 
instrumental rewards and sanctions, as illustrated in taxonomies such as Kasozi’s 
(2008).
Over the past 15 years the neo-institutional lens has become increasingly popular 
among strategic management scholars, especially those exploring processes of 
strategic development and change within an emerging-economy context (Dacin et 
al., 2002; Dhanaraj and Khanna, 2011; Hoskisson et al, 2013; Levy, 2008; Mair et al, 
2012; Pinkse and Kolk, 2012; Régner and Edman, 2014; Wright et al., 2005; Xu and 
Meyer, 2013). Meanwhile, neo-institutional theory itself has continued to evolve, 
especially through the integration of concepts from agency theory and the sociology 
of translation (Akrich et al., 2002a, 2002b; Emirbayer and Mische, 1998) to 
strengthen understanding of the processes through which actors respond to 
institutional pressures and in so doing, exert pressure for change within the 
institutions in which they are embedded. 
The role of institutional context
In order to begin analysing the process through which a given individual or 
organization becomes aware of pressure to internalize new ideas circulating within 
an organizational field, accepting them as norms, it is necessary to establish the 
institutional context within which the actor operates, critically evaluating the extent of 
their embeddedness in the relevant range of structures at industry, national and 
international levels. To explore embeddedness is to focus on the importance of 
social relations and the trust or mistrust that emerges from actors’ experience of 
participating in them. These may smooth, or alternatively obstruct, the process of 
building and sustaining transactional economic relationships, particularly networks of 
exchange that enable the flow of resources such as knowledge, as well as tangible 
goods (Granovetter, 1985; Murdoch et al., 2000). As Krippner (2001, p. 785) says, 
'congealed into every market exchange is a history of struggle and contestation that 
has produced actors with certain understandings of themselves and the world that 
predispose them to exchange under a certain set of social rules and not another.' 
Path dependency, and the length of times that effects last, are important concerns 
for the institutional theorist.
Recent comparative institutional research into Asian business systems has revealed 
that Malaysia’s distinctive pattern of state-business relations, characterized as 
personal capitalism by Carney and Andriesse (2014) has marginalised and excluded 
numerous social groups within peripheral regions such as Sabah. This highlights the 
relevance to our research of the strand of neo-institutional theory focusing on 
institutional failures and voids (North, 1994). Institutional failures due to for example 
corruption or unclear governance frameworks (Nordberg, 2011; Tonoyan et al., 
2010) can have damaging effects on economic performance, social well-being, and 
the propensity to innovate and invest. Entrepreneurial theory suggests that 
successful innovation and growth only happens in a stable institutional context 
(Grabher, 2002). The weaker the institutional framework, the costlier and riskier will 
be contract enforcement and inter-firm coordination (Boschma, 2005; Lundvall, 
1992), favouring those who can afford the necessary costs.
Institutional logics
The concept of institutional logics helps us to explore the dynamics of our 
smallholders' belief systems, including attitudes to sustainability and innovation, as 
they come up against others within the field, or indifferent fields such as those of the 
Malaysian outreach officials and NGOS. Although there are competing definitions of 
the terms, some theorists, beginning with Meyer and Rowan (1977) and Zucker 
(1987), focus on the role of the role of belief systems such as culture and cognition in 
the process through which strong ties develop within organisational fields. Such 
theorists see institutions as the reification and expression of belief systems 
expressed in taken-for-granted rules that develop as a result of social processes 
such as mimetic or coercive isomorphism. In this view, institutions are delimited by 
the logics that define their content and meaning (Scott, 2008; Thornton et al., 2012). 
Logics are concerned with how cultural and cognitive structures shape behaviour 
and organizational arrangements. In a recursive process they shape the macro 
institutional context which in turn influences the institutional logics, or interpretive 
schema, of participants within a specific field.
Institutional theory helps us to assess the instrumental economic and social factors 
that influence logics, and therefore whether practices become adopted within a field. 
Generally, both institutional theorists and innovation adoption theorists say that the 
adoption of new ideas does not happen unless the practice acquires sufficient 
perceived value, whether this value is symbolic or economic. It is known, for 
example, that rural people are sometimes reluctant to engage with policy initiatives 
to improve productivity (Callon, 1986). One explanation for this is that at a local level, 
belief systems are shaped by local experiences and values, few of which incomers 
can access. They cannot draw upon knowledge concerning the local ecology and 
have different experiences which may be perceived as irrelevant, impositional and/or 
intrusive. Such logics are regarded as alien and untrustworthy, and are rejected. 
However, institutional logics are dynamic; they can change, and be changed. For this 
to happen logics need to meet, interact, and be amended through the activities of 
participants in the various fields. Where there are gaps between the fields, the fields' 
logics stay the same (Campbell, 2006, 2007; Delmestri, 201; Winn and Angell, 
2000). In contrast, where individuals participate in more than one organisational field 
they can begin to develop fresh institutional logics combining elements from these 
fields. Two ways of doing this are of special relevance to this paper: firstly, the 
relatively well-known trajectory of subsistence-oriented smallholders who become 
more entrepreneurial through engaging in commercial production (Pritchard et al, 
2007; Sturgeon, 2010; Tucker, 2010); and secondly, the more recently identified and 
less widely studied trajectory of hybrid entrepreneurs who combine waged 
employment with self employment, as farmers for example (Woods, 2007; Burke et 
al, 2008; Burmeister-Lamp et al, 2012; Folta et al, 2010) or who run shops as well as 
farms. Part of our contribution in this paper is to develop an understanding of the 
interplay of the different contextual factors influencing the logics that shape Sabahan 
smallholders’ investment and innovation decisions.
To summarise, from this review of the literature we have identified a range of factors 
that could influence the propensity to innovate and invest in sustainable agricultural 
practices in rural Sabah.  These include structural factors such as property rights in 
land and other resources, including the legal and administrative systems enforcing 
these; as well as relational factors such as belief systems  and political and family 
ties. Institutional theory prompts us to explore the way these factors interrelate and 
change over time, as well as the way in which they enable and constrain the 
behaviour of agents in a given time and place.
The research location: Sabah, Malaysia
This section describes features of the local context that affect MSE palm oil farmers 
in Sabah, on the Island of Borneo. These features help us to identify some of the 
background to the formal and informal institutions that influence their propensity to 
invest and innovate. The information that we describe here is derived from industry 
and government reports, national trade and industry statistics, as well as the 
knowledge of the country that two of the paper's authors have gained from living and 
working there over many years.
Malaysia is a democratically elected state, with a stable coalition government. It is a 
growing player in international trade and economics, although it is still characterised 
as a developing country with a stated ambition to become a developed country by 
2020. However, corruption and a weak regulatory infrastructure are problems 
(McCarthy and Cramb, 2009). The system of property rights, for example is 
ambiguous (Doolittle, 2005; Hall et al., 2011), particularly in the less central regions. 
Similarly, the roads and transport infrastructure are not as good as they need to be, 
particularly in the more remote regions such as Sabah.
Sabah is a State within Malaysia located on the island of Borneo, some distance 
from the centre of power and government in Kuala Lumpur (Figure 1). Unlike 
peninsular Malaysia, which was ruled during the colonial era as set of British 
colonies and protectorates, Sabah and other regions in Borneo were controlled more 
indirectly. Sabah and neighbouring Borneo territories are still not completely 
subsumed within the control of peninsular Malaysia, and indeed Brunei remains an 
independent Sultanate.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Ethnically Sabah is also strikingly different from peninsular Malaysia. The two largest 
ethnic groups in Sabah, the Kadazan Dusun and the Bajau, are both specific to 
Sabah and account for 18% and 14% of the population respectively. Malays, the 
dominant ethnic group within Malaysia as a whole, account for just 6% and 
Malaysian citizens of Chinese ethnicity, who play a key role in the wider national 
economy, make up a further 9% (Malaysian Census, 2010). Malaysian citizens of 
Indian ethnicity, who make a major contribution to both business and the civil service 
elsewhere in the country, are barely present in Sabah, and form only 1% of the 
population. Non-Malaysian citizens, by contrast, account for a very high proportion, 
28%, reflecting the region’s geographical and historical links with the Philippines as 
well as with neighbouring parts of Indonesian Borneo. The remaining 24% of 
Sabah’s population is fragmented into over 30 small indigenous ethnic groups 
(Bumiputera -Lain) speaking more than 50 languages and 80 dialects (PACOS Trust 
2008).
In Malaysia as a whole the transport infrastructure is not as good as it needs to be, 
given its ambition to achieve developed country status, but this is particularly so in 
remote areas such as Sabah (Cooke, 2012; McCarthy and Cramb, 2009). Thus palm 
oil farmers here are geographically distant both from mills and ports in a region with 
poorly maintained roads (Figure 2).
Insert Figure 2 about here
The Sabahan location of palm oil smallholders in our sample
The palm oil industry in Sabah
The palm oil industry accounted for 10% of Malaysia’s exports in 2012, the third 
most important source of export income (Department of Statistics Malaysia, 2014). 
The oil palm planted area in Malaysia reached 5 million hectares in 2011, an 
increase of 3% over 2010.  Sabah is the largest producer with 1.43 million hectares 
or 29% of the total. Neighbouring Sarawak, also on Borneo, is the region where the 
oil palm cultivated area is growing most rapidly, by 8% between December 2012 and 
December 2013, and by 5% in the previous year, in contrast to the growth rate in the 
rest of Malaysia which was under 1% per annum (MPOB, 2013; MPOB, 2014).
Malaysian crude palm oil production in 2011 was second only to Indonesia, with 
Thailand 3rd, but way behind (Index Mundi, 2012). Malaysia, on the other hand, only 
ranks 7th for growth of the industry, compared to 10% for Thailand and 8% for 
Indonesia (ibid). Malaysia exports almost all of its palm oil to countries such as China 
(22.1%), the European Union (11.2%), Pakistan (10.1%), India (9.3%), and the USA 
(5.8%) (MPOB, 2012).
Palm oil is only producible in the tropics, and typically in lesser developed countries.  
Palm oil has very high yields per hectare, and a very wide range of applications from 
food processing to detergents, biodiesel and oleo-chemicals (Corley, 2009). 
Because of its GM free status it is potentially acceptable to ‘green’ consumers, were 
it not for issues around deforestation (Sabah is noted for the rich biodiversity of its 
rainforests), destruction of the orang-utan’s habitat, and social justice (Author 1, 
2004; Pye and Bhattacharya, 2013). In Western Europe and the USA, there is 
widespread public concern about these issues, where big corporations expanding 
their palm oil plantations are well known agents in the process of rainforest 
destruction, especially in Indonesia (McMorrow and Talip, 2001; Pye and 
Bhattacharya, 2013; Greenpeace, 2007; Wicke et al., 2011).  Paradoxically, given 
the well-known problems of big companies destroying rainforest to plant oil palm 
trees in neighbouring Indonesia, Malaysian corporations have been working closely 
with the national government and the non-governmental Roundtable for Sustainable 
Palm OIl to develop socially responsible working practices and sustainable 
technologies, including carbon capture (Reinecke et al, 2011; Teoh, 2010). The most 
pressing difficulties now are perceived to lie in mobilising the smaller growers and 
millers to adopt these new technologies and ways of working.
In fact, the apparent mismatch between the market’s demand for low-priced, 
sustainably-produced, ethical and high quality food ingredients and two of this 
paper's authors' awareness of the apparent reluctance of some rural communities in 
Malaysia to respond to these pull factors was a stimulus to undertaking this study. 
There had been little apparent enthusiasm in the Sabah region for investing in 
innovation, adopting sustainable practices, or raising employment and welfare 
practices to what many in the developed world would deem acceptable standards 
(Author 4, 2014; Rahman et al., 2008). Borneo in general – on both the Malaysian 
and Indonesian sides – is the region where the planted area has been expanding 
most rapidly since the 1990s, generating intense and well-publicised debates on 
illegal felling and destruction of the orang-utan’s habitat. Planners are attempting to 
alleviate this pressure by encouraging rural producers to raise their incomes by 
adopting improved high-yielding planting materials and sustainable cultivation 
techniques. However there is evidence that many rural producers are not engaging 
with these initiatives and in particular they prefer to raise incomes by expanding the 
cultivated area (Teoh, 2010; Baskett et al., 2008).
As a result, rural MSE palm oil producers have been the target for initiatives from the 
government, such as the Malaysian Palm Oil Board (MPOB) and Pusat TUNAS 
(government extension officers) as well as from NGOs and development agencies. 
However, there is increasing awareness that some of these initiatives have not been 
as successful as was hoped, to the extent that the Roundtable for Sustainable Palm 
Oil (RSPO) has even been accused of 'greenwashing' (Reinecke et al., 2011). NGOs 
are highly influential commentators on the issues and are increasingly engaging with 
Western retailers in the process of designing certification schemes (Adderley  and 
Mellor, 2014) but their apparent inability (Author 4, 2014) to engage with smallholder 
communities was another strong driver for this study.  One practical impact of our 
research, we hope, will be to improve their ability to frame the problem and interact 
effectively with small farmers, and to address the unintended socio-political 
outcomes of environmentally focused producer certification schemes. Sabah has 
strong micro regional cultural loyalties, and also linguistic conventions that are 
different from peninsula Malaysia. These tend to affect their ability to participate in 
the discourses favoured by multinational buyers, or governmental or NGO 
representatives (Pye and Bhattacharya, 2013).
Although licensed by the Malaysian Oil Palm Board and hence included within 
Malaysia's formal regulatory frameworks, many smallholders in Sabah lack access to 
fresh supplies of land (Cooke, 2012; Hall et al., 2011). Insecure land rights and weak 
institutional controls (Tonoyan et al., 2010) provide significant obstacles to 
maximising the productivity of investments in new technologies or planting materials: 
the more valuable the stand of oil palm trees planted, the more likely it is that 
alternative claimants will appear to contest the land ownership rights of the 
smallholder who planted them (Cooke, 2006; Tonoyan et al., 2010).
Many are known to conduct at least some of their operations outside Malaysia's 
formal regulatory and investment frameworks (Cooke, 2009). This happens for two 
main reasons. Firstly, the inhabitants of this particular region are economically and 
socially marginalized and disadvantaged compared to the mainland Malays (Then, 
2009; Loo, 2009; Cooke, 2012), who tend to hold more powerful roles as 
government agents or industry middlemen. Secondly, smallholders’ perceptions of 
lax regulations and government corruption make operating in the informal economy 
an attractive option (Reid, 1997; Cooke, 2009). This can take the form of ‘below the 
radar’ use of land, perhaps virgin forest (Daily Express, 2009, 2010) or the 
appropriation of farm land, previously devoted to other crops such as rubber or 
pineapples, whose ownership is uncertain.
Added to this is the problem of low bargaining power in relationships with other 
participants in the supply chain (Thien, 2008; Then, 2009; Mahmud et al., 2010; 
Norwana et al., 2011). Sabahan smallholders are dependent on a small number of 
mills, suppliers of key inputs such as fertilizers and seeds, and agents to whom they 
can sell their produce (Ayat et al, 2009). The combination of poor local education 
standards, lack of experience in the industry (as a result of multiple jobs and 
previous experience with different crops), and lack of awareness of different 
perspectives means that these middlemen are especially powerful (Williamson, 
1981; Vermeulen and Goad, 2006). The miller’s judgement of the quality of the 
farmers’ oil is the only one smallholders have. Their own poor educational standards 
means that millers are also not best placed to advise growers of the yield potentials 
of their crops, the lack of knowledge of palm oil diseases such as Ganoderma, or the 
ways in which innovative use of materials or planting methods could help this (Author 
4, 2014; authors' personal knowledge).
Infrastructure factors
Many of the smallholders in Sabah are based in areas with poor soils and 
infrastructure. Here land is steep, typically rocky and with shallow peat cover, poorly 
drained and sometimes swampy, and prone to flash flooding in the heavy local rains 
(ICZM Project, 1998). The Sabah government's 1960's policy of setting up 
smallholder resettlement schemes had good intentions. However, the land they 
chose was not the most suitable for oil palms, often having poor soil quality, poor 
water supplies, an unsuitable climate, or poor accessibility. The government’s 
apparent failure to assess the topographical features of the land appears to have 
worsened the ecological impact today, increasing soil erosion and increasing the 
impact of floods and road damage.
The remoteness of the region also means that smallholders are geographically 
distant from mills, agricultural supplies, and ports in a region with poorly maintained 
roads. Poor transport is a critical disadvantage within the palm oil industry, because 
oil palm fruit bunches bruise easily, causing free fatty acids to accumulate quickly 
within the oil. Oil palm fruit needs to be transported smoothly and to be milled within 
24 hours of harvest in order to maintain the quality of the oil (Ayat et al, 2009). When 
transport difficulties occur, fruit remains stranded at the roadside waiting to be 
collected, or reaches the mill in damaged condition. This topography means that the 
smallholders are in a poverty trap: the poor quality soil requires higher levels of 
fertilizer in order to increase productivity, which increases the cost of production and 
the poor infrastructure results in higher maintenance costs and lower profits.
Methodology
As suggested above, this research commenced because of the involvement of two of 
the authors in the Malaysian development process. Our personal experiences 
generated an interest in the reasons why Sabahan palm oil smallholders were 
apparently not embracing more sustainable or innovative practices.  Following a 
chance discovery of a common concern with issues of environmental degradation 
and social justice in developing countries, three of this paper's authors came 
together in 2011 and embarked on discussions about some of the theoretical 
reasons why the engagement of smallholders with innovation for sustainability was 
apparently  not happening in Sabah. Our initial conversations revealed a shared 
interest in the application of neo-institutional theory to surface the historical and 
socio-economic influences on current behaviour. We drew on our understanding of 
Malaysian policy issues as well as on theory relating to institutional context.  This 
was followed up by a review of the academic and industry literatures, as well as 
popular sources such as websites and newspapers in Malaysia.  These allowed us 
to begin conceptualising our enquiry and to frame the questions used to structure the 
initial data gathering.
Data gathering commenced when one author went to Sabah for the summer 
holidays and undertook some informal interviews and group discussions with friends 
and acquaintances who work in the palm oil industry. A focus group was conducted 
with four smallholders (meaning those farming less than 4 hectares) in August 2011 
in the local language. The discussion was directed towards finding out the local 
smallholders' experiences and to sensitise the researchers to issues that may have 
not been identified from the literature review. The focus group discussion was 
recorded and transcribed and translated into English.
The analysis of the focus-group findings informed the question areas to be explored 
in the 34 semi-structured individual interviews of the main study. The pilot study also 
highlighted the methodological challenges that we would face in the main study. 
These included the cost of conducting further interviews in the region, language 
difficulties, as there are different ethnic groups in the area, gaining access to enough 
smallholders who would be willing to talk, and so on. This suggested that 
collaboration with local academics in Sabah was essential. As a result, calling once 
again on personal relationships, two further authors of this paper were co-opted into 
the research team.  Both work in Malaysian universities and have contacts in the 
field.
Further conversations with the two new Malaysian members of the research team, 
further helped to refine the interview questions and techniques that were used for the 
main study and which were conducted by the locally-based authors. Even so, 
persuading interviewees to talk sometimes proved challenging in the initial stages, 
as the interviewer was perceived to be an agent of the government. Later interviews 
became more free-flowing as the interviewer was able to develop an introductory 
briefing to the research process which appeared to reassure interviewees that they 
were not under suspicion of wrongdoing. Subsequent analysis of the transcripts 
provided ample evidence for interviewees’ initial reluctance to engage.  The 
challenges of the research process also provided compelling supporting evidence for 
some of the subsequent findings – the need for fluency in the local dialects, the time 
it took to reach the interviewees - at least two hours’ drive from the local university to 
the smallholders’ homes as a result of the poor local road infrastructure, and the 
need to understand local cultural norms, such as the need to sit on the floor to 
conduct the interviews,  as chairs were reserved for important visitors.
Interviewing commenced in July 2012 and finished in June 2013. Interviews were 
voice and/or video recorded with the permission of participants, transcribed and 
translated from Bahasa Malaysia into English by a Sabahan research assistant who 
is fluent in both languages. Most interviews were conducted in the smallholders’ 
homes. Interviewees were identified through a snowballing technique, following 
introductions by personal contacts and other interviewees. Personal contacts were 
an essential element in gaining access to the smallholders. There are profound 
cultural, linguistic and geographical barriers to be overcome if academics in the west 
are to be able to hear the voices of these individuals.
Data analysis
The key themes to emerge from the focus group data could be aggregated into two 
main categories - institutional context and institutional logics. Within the category of 
institutional context were a number of factors to do with land rights, corruption, land 
quality, in terms of soil and infections, supply and distribution chain access, access 
to resources such as labour or technical support, costs of compliance, the geography 
and remoteness of the region, and knowledge acquisition structures.   Within the 
institutional logics category were issues of ethnic and social groupings, linguistic and 
behavioural conventions, experience of farming, hybrid entrepreneurship, and 
attitudes of the local population towards the State, and officials’ attitudes towards the 
smallholders.
The main interview data were analysed using thematic qualitative analysis (Patton, 
2005; Skerratt, 2013) using NVivo 10 as an analytical aid. The questions in the 
interviews were used as categories and all responses for each question were 
examined to identify areas of consensus and differences and the emergence of sub-
themes. Unanticipated themes were also noted. This approach allows a meaningful 
interpretation of the rich interview data.
Results 
In this section we discuss our findings. Our discussion is structured around three 
themes: institutional context, personal influences on institutional logics, and the 
effects of these on behaviour. In doing this we are not attempting to provide definitive 
answers about smallholder behaviour, but simply to attempt to describe and 
understand the influences on Sabahan smallholders' investment and innovation 
decisions.
The first thing to say is that none of our cohort of smallholders were investing to a 
great extent in either innovative technologies or sustainable methods, despite the 
efforts put into encouraging this by organisations such as the Malaysian government 
and the MPOB. But, different individuals had different reasons underpinning their 
choices, and it is these influences that we focus on here. 
We could discern two main groups within our 34 respondents:
1) Hybrid entrepreneurs - those who have a palm oil smallholding plus off-farm 
employment or self-employment, for example as mechanics or shopkeepers.
2) Specialist smallholders who had income from oil palm cultivation, and occasionally 
other crops and livestock, but no off-farm income.
A question emerged therefore from our data analysis: do the smallholders who 
depend entirely on farming for their income exhibit different attitudes to sustainability 
or the adoption of innovative farming methods from those who have other sources of 
off-farm income? We structure the discussion of each group's attitudes around the 
factors that appeared to influence their behavioural choices, grouped into: 1) 
institutional context (including access to land, capital and other resources); and 2) 
personal factors influencing institutional logics (including experiences, education and 




In this section we pull out and discuss the most material of the findings summarised 
above, given our interest in the smallholders' propensity to invest in sustainable 
production or innovative farming methods. Some of the findings appeared to have 
little relevance (age and ethnicity for example) despite our initial predictions that they 
would be material.  
Smallholders and Land Ownership
Although for the most part licensed by the Malaysian Oil Palm Board and hence 
involved, in theory, in Malaysia's formal regulatory frameworks, many of the 
smallholders lacked legal access to good quality land. Local systems of land rights 
are multi-layered and ambiguous, and government titles recognizing individual 
ownership of land are often allocated haphazardly in ways influenced by current 
contestation as well as historic administrative decisions (Doolittle, 2005).  Many of 
our smallholder group, in both hybrid and specialist categories, were aware of 
historical land-grabbing, or had experienced it themselves. An example of this was 
provided by four ethnic Chinese smallholders who claimed that they had been 
unable to obtain land rights as a result of their ethnicity. Between 2004 and 2008 
they had participated in a large cooperative project in which approximately 150 
ethnic Filipino and Chinese smallholders applied for formal title to a 5,300-acre plot 
of land in Tawau District, in the south-east of Sabah. They were encouraged to do so 
by the local Department of Land and Survey. Pending the award of this title, they 
planted oil palms on the plot. This practice is widely followed within Sabah because 
of the slow pace with which land title applications are normally processed. However, 
four years later, once the trees had reached maturity, two alternative Bumiputera 
claimants to the land emerged who were able to prove legal title from prior to 2004. 
As a result the co-operative's members lost the ownership of the oil palms that had 
been planted and nurtured to maturity. All respondents agreed that they had been 
misled by officials and that "within the government, there is just a pile of problems." 
Thus, to plant trees which visibly enhance the economic value of a given plot of land 
was perceived as being likely to attract the attention of land-grabbers or opportunistic 
fruit-gatherers, generating anxiety which appeared to provide an obstacle to the 
smallholders making long term investments, thus providing support for research that 
suggests that successful innovation and growth only happens in a stable institutional 
context (Grabher, 2002).
Many of our respondents  described the Malaysian Land registry department as a 
weak institution that, despite its supposed role of granting land rights to citizens, 
could take as long as ten years to register ownership. Frustrating administrative 
obstacles were reported, as one respondent details:
"I just feel that this issue has been very irritating. This land originally belonged to my 
ancestors, after they had passed away, their names were replaced with the second 
owner. However, when this owner had died, we have tried to return the rights of the 
land to the original family, but it has been disallowed on the grounds that some of the 
original owners are no longer with us. The only way for the land to be returned to the 
original family is by having the signatures of all the original owners whose names 
were on the contract, however that is not possible since some of them have died." 
Another respondent highlighted a lack of trust in the impartiality of the registration 
process: 
"We have applied for permission for many other plots of land but it is still being 
scrutinised. I feel that the authority is rather biased when deciding to whom they 
would provide permits to plant in these lands as they would often favour big 
companies … Take my family for example, I am the second generation of planters in 
this region, say when my children are older and wish to follow my footstep, I would 
give him a small piece of my land to try his hands. However, if more than one wishes 
to do likewise, how am I going to be able to provide enough to all of them? That area 
then you can see there, used to be timber. Now it is mostly governed by estates with 
thousands and thousands of acres. That is the issue with the government."
The slowness and perceived unreliability of the formal registration process 
encouraged the 'under the radar' acquisition of land often not the most suitable for oil 
palms, having poor soil quality, poor water supplies, an unsuitable climate, and poor 
accessibility. 
Farm Expansion, Investment and Credit
The delays and difficulties of establishing legal title to land help to explain why 
smallholders were reluctant to claim assistance for improving their land or adopting 
new, more sustainable, methods of production, and/or to create the sorts of 
cooperatives that would enable economies of scale to be achieved (Cooke, 2006, 
2012; Hall et al., 2011; Vermeulen and Goad, 2006). Seven of the specialist 
smallholders we interviewed had recently expanded their oil palm planted area, but 
had funded this entirely themselves, without recourse to bank loans or even short-
term cash advances from the mills to which they sold their fresh fruit bunches  (FFB). 
The hybrid entrepreneurs showed a greater propensity to obtain bank loans and 
cash advances, but were not using these to expand their oil palm holdings. Several 
mentioned that they would be interested in cultivating additional land if they had 
better access, time and money but this was expressed as a hypothetical possibility 
and in practice they were devoting time and money to alternative uses, for example 
education for their children or investing in a shop. This behaviour implies an 
underlying scepticism about whether the palm oil industry is worth investing in for the 
future.
We could discern few differences between the hybrids and specialists as to their 
preferences as to how they obtained credit.  Both hybrid entrepreneurs and specialist 
farmers exhibit a strong belief in self-funding for farm investment. However the 
hybrids showed slightly greater interest in obtaining bank loans compared to the 
specialists. One specialist smallholder had obtained and paid back a bank loan in the 
past, and was loyal to the miller she regularly supplied because they offered her 
short-term loans; but this farmer had made no recent extensions or improvements to 
her farm. As argued above, the specialist farmers’ lack of interest in obtaining bank 
loans to support their expansion may well be related to fear of land-grabbing and a 
general distrust towards outsiders. However, it may also stem from a lack of relevant 
knowledge and skills to undertake the process of accessing funds. Seven out of the 
eighteen specialist smallholders (39%) had no formal education, and only three 
(17%) were educated to secondary level or above. In contrast, all of the hybrid 
entrepreneurs had some formal education, and ten out of the sixteen (63%) were 
educated to secondary level or above.
In all cases, a preference for, and dependence on, self-funding limits the potential for 
developing the smallholding. A lack of capital also reduced the smallholders' ability to 
acquire the technical resources necessary to increase yields and fight against deadly 
fungal attacks on the oil palms, thereby reducing profits and the capital available to 
invest. 
Apart from self-funding, bank loans, and the much rarer option of cash advances 
from the millers, the main alternative source of finance would be government-linked 
organisations such as Pertubuhan Peladang Kawasan (PPK), a large co-operative 
agricultural trading organisation whose members can potentially obtain loans from it 
as well as selling their palm fruit to it, and buying seedlings and fertiliser from it, 
sometimes (although not often) with the benefit of government subsidies. However, 
neither hybrid entrepreneurs nor specialist smallholders reported having actually 
received credit from PPK.
Bargaining Power and Productivity
Most of our smallholders had low bargaining power relative to that of middlemen 
such as suppliers and millers; they were price takers rather than price makers. This 
may well have resulted in them getting relatively low prices from the mills; certainly 
they received prices that did not differentiate between different grades of fruit.  Both 
hybrid entrepreneurs and specialist smallholders reported that the millers routinely 
told them that all their fruit was grade A when all other indicators suggest that this is 
likely to be untrue. As with smallholders in many other countries and agricultural 
sectors, low bargaining power is likely to have combined with low productivity to limit 
their incomes and hence their potential for self-funded innovation and growth.
Access to labour, which is a pressing issue in Malaysia’s plantations sector, was not 
mentioned as an issue by any of our respondents. This may well be linked to the 
small size and generally limited expansion of their existing oil palm holdings. Only 
two respondents, both hybrid entrepreneurs, had holdings larger than 25 acres. Of 
these, one (whose holding was 45 acres) employed two permanent workers and got 
further help from his children with harvesting. The other (whose holding was 70 
acres of which 60 was under oil palms and the rest under fruit trees) also employed 
two permanent workers and got further help from three or four family members with 
harvesting. 
Transport infrastructure, on the other hand, was mentioned as a key problem by five 
out of the eighteen specialist smallholders (28%), and by a further one out of the 16 
hybrid entrepreneurs. The government was criticised as being unwilling or unable to 
maintain the local roads adequately in the face of hilly terrain and frequent torrential 
rainstorms.
Our respondents were united in their dissatisfaction with the road infrastructure, 
commenting that even Land Rovers found the roads hard to negotiate, especially 
during the rainy season when floods are common and the hilly surfaces become 
mudslides. As one respondent commented, "even though the roads are accessible 
however they can change whenever we are expecting rain." Another confirmed, "At 
the moment the roads to the factories are poor, the vehicle that I have will not 
manage to go uphill."
The poor infrastructure reduces the ability of smallholders to acquire knowledge such 
as technical know-how relating to farm management (for example a number of our 
interviewees were unable to understand the difference between organic and 
inorganic fertilizers), but also information about the SPOC (sustainable palm oil 
clusters) initiatives and sustainability concerns further up the supply chain had simply 
not been heard. 
Given our interest in the Sabahan smallholders' propensity to invest in sustainable 
practices or innovative technologies, one important aspect to investigate is how they 
learn about  new initiatives and ideas, and how they understand the market pull 
factors that shape what is bought and for how much. The evidence from our study 
suggest that there is little awareness of these issues from either hybrids or 
specialists: Our smallholders could be described as disconnected - from the 
plantations sector, NGOs,  government outreach agents and consumers alike.  As 
suggested above this is partly the function of the geographical remoteness of the 
region, the ethnic isolation of many of the smallholders, the distrust of outsiders and 
the strong culture of self reliance and autonomy (Stewart and Roth, 2007; 
Brandstätter, 2011). 
However, for the hybrid entrepreneurs in particular this simple explanation is 
insufficient, for they were not disconnected from the formal sector in other respects. 
Not only were they all educated formally, as noted above, but also eleven out of the 
sixteen respondents in this group (69%), three of whom were pensioners, derived 
income from formal-sector occupations including those of: driver, mechanic, port 
employee, civil servant and worker in the palm oil plantations sector. This suggests 
that they may be described as disconnected from the discourse relating to innovation 
for productivity and sustainability within the palm oil industry specifically, rather than 
within the local formal sector in general.
Buyer and Seller Relationships
Generally, the smallholders' linkages to the wider palm oil supply chain came 
through their local buyer, typically the miller. Most smallholders were not loyal to one 
buyer. Their decision as to who to sell to was partially governed by whether they 
could transport the fruit there, either in their own truck or through renting space in 
someone else's. Sometimes the FFB (fresh fruit bunches, which are quickly 
perishable) were abandoned on the roadside because of a lack of available 
transport. Another factor, mentioned by a small number of respondents, was whether 
the miller was prepared to loan money when cash flow was tight. More widely seen 
as important was whether the miller was perceived to have weighed the bunches 
fairly or assessed the fruit as top quality 'A' grade - and therefore paid the best price. 
Five specialist smallholders and three hybrid entrepreneurs commented that the 
millers always graded their own, or all, FFB as ‘A’, and only one mentioned the 
possibility that lower quality fruit might be graded ‘B’. 
This suggests that millers rarely if ever paid a price premium for superior quality fruit; 
and this is a factor that could easily have contributed to the failure to invest in better 
planting technologies.  One hybrid entrepreneur, who was generally one of the best 
informed respondents in terms of awareness of potential innovations, had invested in 
a relatively large farm. He had undertaken some planting experiments  and had 
replanted  in order to obtain better fruit. However, when selling to the government-
linked agricultural co-operative trading organisation Pertubuhan Peladang ,  he 
discovered that he had been given the same price by weight for his FFB (fresh fruit 
bunches) as that offered to other smallholders whose bunches were visibly inferior. 
He had therefore decided to build a relationship with a neighbouring plantation 
company and sold to them instead. Such a lack of discrimination on the part of a 
major buying agency acts as a deterrent to smallholders’ investment in improved 
planting materials and techniques designed to raise FFB quality. But one interesting 
question that is as yet unresolved is why the smallholders are so unquestioning 
about the prices they are offered, and why the majority are not interested in imitating 
the one pioneer we could identify. There is apparently a deeply-embedded culture of  
rather passive price-taking rather than market-sensing. But why this is so was not 
revealed by our data.
Any official attempt to erode the power of the millers over the smallholders who 
supply them with fruit, for example by encouraging the smallholders to form 
marketing co-operatives under the supervision of extension workers from the MPOB, 
appears to have had little success. In this area considerable importance is attached 
to a ‘coffee shop’ culture, where the influence of neighbours and friends is especially 
strong. In this very exclusive context, tacit knowledge and biases are shared readily, 
and outsiders are rare. Few of our interviewees were aware of best practices from 
elsewhere in the industry, and SPOC methodologies were not known about. 
Although most have phones and access to the internet and the information to be 
found there, few knew how to make sense of it, and there were few examples of 
people who were prepared to stand out. Even the hybrids, who encounter different 
perspectives when they enter the different organisational fields in which they 
participate, did not appear to be any more willing to challenge the purchasing 
structures within the region.  
Attitudes to sustainability and investment
It is in their attitudes to investing in the palm oil industry that we could discern some 
important differences between the hybrids and the specialists.  Ten (63%) of the 
hybrids were not obviously investing in any significant way in their plantations, 
whereas this applied to only eight (44%) of the specialists. Eight of the specialists 
(45%) were investing in either improvements or expansion compared to two (13%) of 
the hybrids. Three of the hybrids (19%) were choosing to invest off-farm compared to 
none of the specialists. This picture suggests that the hybrids are only weakly 
interested in their plantations, having other competing, and maybe more profitable, 
calls on their funds and time. One hybrid described his farm as disappointing, 
explaining that because he was working he didn't have time to look after it - and 
yields were, consequently, low. But he also illustrates some of the conflicting 
influences on decision-making: he can't afford fertiliser so mulches low-quality FFB 
instead, putting empty shells round the trees and showering them with palm oil. 
However, he also said that even if he used proper fertiliser his yields would still be 
low because the farm is on hillside, with uneven ground.  So there is evidence that 
there is a perception that investment is not worth it. Nevertheless he Is applying for a 
grant to acquire more land. The question, therefore, is why are the hybrids farming at 
all - especially given the problems described above about the inability to obtain 
formal rights to their farms and the fear of land grab. 
One potentially significant detail is that none had been growing oil palms for fewer 
than five years, and eleven out of the sixteen (69%) had been growing oil palms for 
ten years or longer. When combined with the information noted above about recent 
plantings, that seven out of the eighteen specialist smallholders (39%) had recently 
extended their oil palm holdings, whereas none of the hybrid  entrepreneurs had 
done so, this suggests that the hybrid entrepreneurs were relatively disengaged from 
the process of envisioning and creating a future in the palm oil industry. This is 
consistent with hypotheses advanced within the emerging theory of hybrid 
entrepreneurship, that the characteristic institutional logic of hybrid entrepreneurs 
whose activities span multiple organisational fields prioritises portfolio-building and 
the generation of multiple options to be kept open simultaneously, rather than 
placing a high value on the single-minded pursuit of efficiency and effectiveness 
within a given organisational field.  
In terms of the choices that the smallholders were making of fertilizer, seeds, and 
planting technologies, the hybrids on the whole appeared to be better informed - 
although this was from an extremely low base. Both groups wanted to improve 
yields, wanted to receive subsidies for fertilizers, but both groups had almost no 
knowledge of, or interest in, the 'sustainability' of the chemicals in it. Although the 
hybrids seemed to have a better understanding of the differences between types of 
fertilizers, choices were not made on sustainability or ethical grounds but on purely 
economic or effectiveness ones. Of the sixteen hybrid one third were knowledgeable 
about some sustainability issues, such as organic methods, intercropping and 
climate change. However, only four were adopting these methods, and none 
wholeheartedly.  The eighteen specialists were much less likely to have 
experimented with organic or other types of sustainable methods, and very few 
appeared to be aware of the issues. Many were unable to identify the type of 
fertilizer they used, or if they were, why they tended to prefer chemical fertilizers. 
Only a couple had actually used organic fertilizers, and had subsequently rejected 
them on the grounds of cost ineffectiveness. 
Conclusions: implications for further research and for 
practice
In this paper we have sought to understand the reasons behind the investment and 
innovation decisions of a group of palm oil smallholders in Sabah. The remoteness 
of this region poses special challenges for researchers in the West or even in the 
more developed regions of Malaysia: there are cultural, linguistic and geographical 
barriers to be overcome if we wish to hear the voices of these individuals. Using neo-
institutional theory as a guiding framework has helped us to recognise the existence 
of micro-communities and multiple institutional logics within the population under 
study, and also, incidentally, to understand our own biases, motives, and practices 
when working with this particular community.  Our study has highlighted the 
difficulties for researchers  working with rural smallholders in marginal regions, and 
the importance of focusing on the processes of engagement, at emotional, linguistic 
and contextual levels both in the data-gathering and analysis stages.  There were 
frequent occasions in which previously unrecognized biases and assumptions were 
brought face-to-face with different perspectives and values. 
In identifying these findings we are contributing to an academic conversation 
exploring the politics of local interaction (including processes of exclusion and 
marginalization) that affect farmers’ access to and engagement with users upstream 
in the palm oil production chain and with development policy initiatives. Our findings 
strengthen our understanding of palm oil smallholder behaviour in identifying some 
blockages in the institutional stream relating to the implementation of organic or 
sustainable food production methods. Our interviewees were pretty much universally 
not interested, or much aware of, the sorts of concerns that matter to some Western 
consumers of palm oil or outreach officers from NGOs and the Malaysian 
government.  
Partly this appears to stem from strongly institutionalised logics to prefer local 
interactions, with mills for example, to distrust the government or any agency that 
has a quasi-governmental feel to it.  Thus the power of millers is strong, despite our 
(as researchers) surprise that they should be recipients of such unquestioning faith. 
Why this should be so is a question for further research. However, our interpretation 
of this institution is that this has had deleterious, unintended, consequences in 
blocking any competitive market forces and therefore incentives to improve yields 
and farming methodologies.
Lack of awareness of alternatives was also discernible in the smallholders' lack of 
knowledge about, and therefore investment in, more sustainable or innovative 
methods. Pusat TUNAS officers are currently trying to engage independent 
smallholders in a process of innovation for sustainability using RSPO principles 
(Abas et al, 2010; Pemandu, 2012). The RSPO growth model discourages rainforest 
clearance and encourages established industry players to increase output and 
incomes by replanting improved materials on existing palm oil land, while adopting 
new technologies and ways of working to minimize carbon emissions and promote 
biodiversity. However, their task of interessement and enrolment (Akrich et al., 
2002a, 2002b; Callon, 1986) appears to be encountering at best indifference, ; very 
little was known about the Pusat TUNAS model among our respondents.
Our findings provides some answers to this;  Sabahan smallholders clearly have 
different priorities and interests. In the case of the hybrids these focused on their 
other activities. Thus, although they were for the most part more knowledgeable 
about different farming methods, they lacked the will or time to apply this to their own 
farms. Any improvements that could be made by the specialists' with their greater 
focus on investing in their farms was hindered by their lack of knowledge. One 
puzzling question that our data did not answer and that would benefit from further 
research, is why the hybrids are choosing to invest in farms that they cannot, or will 
not,  manage properly. In some cases they are even adding to an existing holding.  
We presume that there is income to be made even given little effort, but not enough 
income to make the hybrids feel that it is worth giving up their 'day jobs'. 
Malaysia is a transitional economy. In this context, it makes sense to explore multiple 
opportunities simultaneously. Experience and the socio-political environment had not 
encouraged the hybrid entrepreneurs in our cohort to risk committing wholeheartedly 
to palm oil production (Thien, 2008; McCarthy and Cramb, 2009). There is also 
evidence that new investment is flowing into the Sabahan palm oil industry from 
urban employees seeking to invest their savings in ways that can establish 
ownership of land. This links to the strongly family oriented culture and the desire to 
produce something lasting for children to inherit. It may also be a way of attempting 
to mitigate against the unclear land ownership regulatory environment.  Although 
these questions remain to be answered, an implication is that farmland is being 
taken up and managed ineffectively by people who have no real current interest in 
making economic use of the land. 
Our findings have policy implications for organisation seeking to engage with these 
two types of smallholder, in that any single 'one size fits all' solution is likely to 
address neither group effectively.  We have identified strongly embedded local ties 
accompanied by low levels of embeddedness in the palm oil industry's wider field. 
Institutionalised beliefs and differences between formal agencies and their outreach 
workers and the smallholders was made difficult not only because of geographical 
distance but because of the lack of awareness of the likely responses within the 
localised network (Ponds et al., 2007). One consequence is that the government-
linked trading organisation PPK is locally being run in a way which dis-incentivises 
investment in better farming methods. There need to be changes to the grading and 
pricing processes, which would reward farmers who produce better fruit and in more 
sustainable ways. Currently the incentives are not there. This is a problem also if 
organic certification is to be achieved; the mills cannot be certified unless all the 
participants in the supply chain can themselves be certified. At the moment none of 
the certification processes are in place. 
The issues explored in this paper are of relevance not only to smallholders and 
policy-makers in Malaysia but also to managers working in NGOs and international 
organizations like the World Bank and the FAO, and finally to supply chain managers 
concerned to support environmentally and socially sustainable practices in regions 
remote from Western consumption (Burton and Paragahawewa, 2011).   
Supermarket chains and other major buyers are increasingly seeking evidence of 
sustainable production within their long global supply chains (Ehrgott et al., 2011). A 
failure to understand the different behaviours of hybrid or specialist producers may 
result in unclear or poor government communication strategies that focus 
inappropriately on certain indicators and procedures without acknowledging the 
different priorities of those operating in an informal or weakly-regulated economy, 
and without understanding that a poorly educated workforce lacks the knowledge to 
be able to judge the value of initiatives that may be self-evident to others from 
different institutional backgrounds. Our research has surfaced the possibility that the 
RSPO sustainability model may be poorly designed to appeal to smallholders. 
Developed by large corporations in association with equally large NGOs and with 
government encouragement (especially in Malaysia), the RSPO model is essentially 
productivist in approach and does not address the cultural or production needs of 
Sabahan smallholders. The small scale and portfolio entrepreneurship characteristic 
of Sabah palm oil production implies that discourses of conservation are unlikely to 
resonate with smallholders (Doolittle, 2005, 2007; Dove, 2011; Dove, et al., 2011).
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Figure 1
Sabah, Malaysia (Source Google Maps, 2013)
Figure 2









Acreage Range between 2 acres and 70 acres; mean size 15 
acres
Range between 2 acres  and 23 acres; mean size 11 
acres
Land title  Problems in obtaining official land ownership title Problems in obtaining official  land ownership title
Access to 
capital
Three respondents had obtained bank loans although 
a further one had tried and failed to do so.
Preference for self funding
No mention of borrowing from millers
One had obtained a bank loan in the distant past.
None had current bank loans.
Preference for self funding
One had obtained short-term credit from Dinar mill; 




Seven (44%) employ some wage labour, typically one 
or two people 
Limited additional support for harvesting from 
contractors
Six own trucks to transport fresh fruit bunches to 
millers Nine rent space on trucks
Eight (44%) employ some wage labour, typically one or 
two people 
Limited additional support for harvesting from contractors
Three own trucks to transport fresh fruit bunches to millers 




Education All had some formal education.
Six were qualified to primary education level (leaving 
at 11 years old).
Seven were educated to secondary school level (age 
17 or 18).
Three had qualifications at college level or above.
A number had had some work experience (and 
therefore training) in government jobs or palm oil 
manufacturing facilities.
Seven had had no formal education.
Three had been educated at primary level.
Three were qualified to secondary education level.
This was not correlated with gender, although it tended to 
be correlated with age.
Age Younger on average: 
Three are in their 20’s; three in 30’s; two in 40’s; three 
in 50’s; four in 60’s and one in his 70’s.
Older on average: 
Three are in their 30’s; two in 40’s; seven in 50’s; four in 
60’s and two in their 70’s.
Gender 13 male and 3 female 10 male and 8 female.
Ethnicity Nine are Orang Sungai, four are Kadazan Dusun, two 
are Sinor Kadazan (Chinese Dusun Heritage) and 
one Indonesian.
Diverse: Twelve are Orang Sungai; one each of Dusun, 
Bajau, Kadazan, Chinese, a mixed heritage of Orang 






10 play the field
6  are loyal
Simbolik ( 1) – the respondent valued this mill for its close 
proximity to his farm
Malsa (3) – no reasons given
Dinar Harapan (2) – prompt cash payment, fair price
Five play the field
Two did not care where they sold to, and said this depended on 
the destination of the truck on which they rented space
11 are loyal
Peladang -3 – family relationship to miller and fair pricing
Malsa  - 4 - fair grading and proximity
Dinar   - 4 - family relationship to miller and fair grading
Attitudes to 
investment
none expansion improvement reducing
investing 
off farm
10 1 1 1 3
62.5 6.3% 6.3% 6.3% 18.8%
none expansion improvement reducing
investing 
off farm
8 7 1 2 0
44.4 38.9 5.6 11.1 0 %
Attitudes to 
sustainability






2 are not engaging 
with sustainability 
initiatives on grounds 
















Aware but not 
engaging
Taking some 
action Not interested
7 0 11
38.9% 0.0% 61.1%
